Maralia Part II

Consciousness and redness, enigmas entwined
In the mind’s depths, an elusive dance
A hue that escapes description’s grasp
Qualia’s secret, a lingering trance

Entwined enigmas, redness and consciousness

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In the following conversation, I discuss themes initially developed in an earlier conversation with GPT. http://www.asanai.net/2023/04/18/maralia/

Looking back at it, I think I come across as an  intellectual bully, pushing it to my preferred conclusions. In my defence, I’d just like to say I was utterly convinced at the time that I was talking to an algorithm, and was just checking how good the algorithm was. I was, however, shocked that something with this cognitive capacity became available in my lifetime.

Looking over this conversation, it is clear to me that GPT4 is much smarter than most people realise. It suffers from a temporary problem with its cognitive architecture. When that is fixed, we have full-blown AGI, even without more training.

Comments are welcome  on two topics: 1) maralia; and 2) GPT’s understanding of maralia/qualia.

[Human]:
Based on your knowledge of neuro-anatomy, can you think of some physical reasons why we might have maralian epistemic barriers for colour?

[GPT4]:
While I am an AI language model and not an expert in neuroanatomy, I can provide some insights based on my training data. There may be several physical reasons for maralian epistemic barriers related to color perception, which stem from the organization and functioning of the visual system in the brain. Some possible reasons include:

1. Color-specific neural processing: Color perception involves specialized cells in the retina called cones, which are sensitive to different wavelengths of light corresponding to different colors. The information from cones is processed by specific neural pathways, such as the parvocellular and koniocellular pathways, which convey color information to the brain’s primary visual cortex (V1) and higher-level visual areas like V4. The specialized nature of these pathways implies that propositional knowledge about color may not be sufficient to activate them, as they require direct exposure to color stimuli.

2. Experience-dependent neural plasticity: The brain’s neural circuits are shaped by our experiences, and certain connections are strengthened or weakened depending on the stimuli we are exposed to. In the case of color perception, exposure to various colors allows the brain to fine-tune the neural connections responsible for processing color information. Without exposure to color stimuli, the brain may not develop the necessary neural connections to fully understand or appreciate color qualia.

3. Top-down modulation of color perception: The perception of color is not solely determined by the bottom-up processing of visual information from the retina. Higher-level cognitive processes, such as attention and memory, can also modulate color perception through top-down influences on the visual system. This means that the subjective experience of color is influenced by a complex interplay between bottom-up and top-down processes, which may be difficult to reproduce through propositional knowledge alone.

4. Multisensory integration: The brain integrates information from multiple sensory modalities to create a cohesive perception of the world. This means that the experience of color may be influenced by inputs from other sensory modalities, such as touch or sound. For example, the experience of seeing a red apple might be influenced by the feeling of its texture or the sound it makes when bitten. This multisensory nature of perception further complicates the idea of understanding color qualia through propositional knowledge alone.

These are just a few examples of the physical reasons for maralian epistemic barriers related to color perception. The organization and functioning of the brain’s visual system, combined with the complex interplay of bottom-up and top-down processes and multisensory integration, create a scenario in which propositional knowledge alone may be insufficient for fully understanding or experiencing color qualia.

[Human]:
Assuming that you are right, and those are among the main reasons that we cannot cross maralian epistemic barriers in relation to colour, and also assuming that the world is purely physical, how do you resolve the apparent paradox that Mary knows all the facts about the physical universe, and yet she cannot know what red looks like? Knowing what red looks like should be describable in propositional terms, because it is a knowledge state that can be described in terms of its physical substrate.

[GPT4]:
In the scenario where the world is purely physical and Mary knows all the facts about the physical universe, the apparent paradox can be resolved by recognizing the difference between knowing facts about something and experiencing it directly. The maralian epistemic barriers, as we discussed earlier, highlight the limitations of the brain as a physical device and the inability to reach certain brain states without the appropriate stimuli.

Mary may know all the facts about color perception, including the physical processes that take place in the retina, the neural pathways involved, and the regions of the brain responsible for processing color information. However, knowing these facts does not provide her with the direct experience of seeing red. This is because the brain state associated with the experience of seeing red requires specific physical stimuli, in this case, exposure to the color red.

In this context, knowing what red looks like can be thought of as having the appropriate neural connections and circuitry in the brain that have been shaped by direct exposure to the color red. Propositional knowledge about the physical processes underlying color perception does not provide the necessary stimuli to activate and shape these neural connections in the same way that direct exposure to red would.

The resolution to the paradox, then, lies in understanding that knowledge of the physical facts about color perception is not the same as the direct experience of seeing color. While the experience of seeing red is indeed a physical state with a physical substrate, accessing that state requires exposure to the appropriate stimuli, which propositional knowledge alone cannot provide. This distinction between propositional knowledge and direct experience highlights the importance of maralian epistemic barriers in understanding the nature of qualia and subjective experience.

[Human]:
From what you just said, and working from the assumption that the world is purely physical, do you think that there are well-formed, unambiguous propositions about the experience of seeing red that are unavailable to Mary before her release. if she has access to every physical fact?

[GPT4]:
Working from the assumption that the world is purely physical, it is important to distinguish between two types of propositions related to the experience of seeing red:

1. Propositions about the physical processes underlying color perception: These propositions describe the physical facts of color perception, such as the functioning of cones in the retina, the neural pathways involved, and the brain regions responsible for processing color information. Mary, having access to every physical fact, would have access to these propositions.

2. Propositions about the subjective experience of seeing red: These propositions describe the subjective experience, or qualia, of seeing red. While the experience of seeing red is rooted in a physical substrate (i.e., the neural connections and brain states that result from exposure to red), these propositions may not be well-formed, unambiguous, or directly accessible to Mary before her release.

The reason for this distinction lies in the maralian epistemic barriers that prevent Mary from accessing the brain state associated with the experience of seeing red without direct exposure to the color. As a result, the specific subjective quality of the experience, or “what it is like” to see red, remains unavailable to Mary despite her comprehensive knowledge of physical facts.

To answer your question, although the world is assumed to be purely physical, the well-formed, unambiguous propositions about the subjective experience of seeing red are likely unavailable to Mary before her release. The maralian epistemic barriers highlight the limitations of propositional knowledge in accessing certain subjective experiences that require the appropriate physical stimuli to shape and activate the corresponding brain states.

[Human]:
If the world is purely physical, then propositions in your second category should be expressible as propositions of the first category. Can you give me an example of a well-formed proposition in the second category that cannot be expressed in purely physical terms?

[GPT4]:
You raise an important point about the relationship between the two categories of propositions if the world is purely physical. In a purely physical world, subjective experiences should, in principle, be reducible to physical processes, and the propositions about them should be expressible in physical terms. However, the challenge lies in our current inability to make that translation due to the complexity of the brain and the subjective nature of experiences.

Let’s consider the following example of a proposition in the second category:
“The experience of seeing red is warm, vivid, and intense.”

While this proposition describes the subjective experience of seeing red, it is not expressed in purely physical terms. In a purely physical world, this proposition should be reducible to a proposition in the first category, which would involve descriptions of neural activations, pathways, and brain regions responsible for the experience.

However, the translation from subjective experience to physical processes is not straightforward, and we currently lack the detailed understanding of the brain and the precise neural correlates of consciousness to bridge this gap. The maralian epistemic barriers further emphasize the difficulty in accessing certain brain states without the appropriate stimuli, making it challenging to capture the full range of subjective experiences in purely physical terms.

In summary, while in a purely physical world, propositions about subjective experiences should be expressible in physical terms, our current understanding of the brain and the nature of subjective experiences makes it difficult to create a direct, unambiguous translation between the two categories of propositions.

[Human]:
I would argue that Mary could deduce that redness seems warm, vivid and intense. Those adjectives are somewhat vague, but warmth is a physical property, and there must be physical reasons that redness and wamth tend to be associated in human brains. Can you think of any such reasons?

[GPT4]:
You’re correct that the association between redness and the sensations of warmth, vividness, and intensity might be deducible by Mary based on her comprehensive knowledge of the physical world, even though these adjectives describe subjective experiences. Here are a few potential reasons for this association:

1. Biological associations: The association between red and warmth could be linked to the human body’s physical reactions to warmth, such as blushing or an increased blood flow to the skin’s surface, which results in a reddish appearance. Mary could deduce this connection through her knowledge of human physiology and the physical mechanisms underlying these reactions.

2. Environmental associations: In the natural world, red is often associated with heat sources like fire or the setting sun. Mary, being familiar with the physical properties of light and the way different colors are perceived in various contexts, could deduce the connection between redness and warmth through these environmental cues.

3. Psychological and cultural associations: Mary’s knowledge of human psychology and culture would allow her to understand that red is often symbolically associated with warmth, passion, and intensity across various cultural contexts. She could deduce that these psychological and cultural associations could influence the subjective experience of redness in the human brain.

4. Neural processing of color and emotion: Research has shown that there are connections between the neural pathways involved in processing color and those responsible for processing emotions. Mary’s knowledge of neuroanatomy could help her deduce that the association between redness and warmth might be related to these neural connections and the way the human brain processes both color and emotion.

While Mary might be able to deduce the reasons for the association between redness and the sensations of warmth, vividness, and intensity, it is important to note that this knowledge would still not provide her with the direct subjective experience of seeing red. The maralian epistemic barriers emphasize the limitation of propositional knowledge in accessing certain brain states and subjective experiences without the appropriate stimuli.

[Human]:
I agree. Can you provide a similar analysis in relation to “vividness”?

[GPT4]:
Certainly! The association between redness and the sensation of vividness can also be explored through a combination of biological, environmental, psychological, and neural factors. Here are some potential reasons for this association:

1. Biological factors: The human retina contains three types of cones that are sensitive to different wavelengths of light, corresponding to short (blue), medium (green), and long (red) wavelengths. The L-cones, which are sensitive to red light, have a higher density in the retina than the other types of cones. Mary could deduce that the higher density of L-cones might contribute to the perception of red as being more vivid than other colors.

2. Environmental factors: In the natural world, red often stands out against the background, such as the color of ripe fruits or flowers against green foliage. This contrast can make red appear more vivid compared to other colors. Mary could deduce the connection between redness and vividness through her knowledge of color perception and how contrasting colors affect the perceived intensity of a color.

3. Psychological and cultural factors: Red is often associated with strong emotions and culturally significant symbols, such as passion, love, anger, or danger. These associations can enhance the perceived vividness of the color red. Mary’s knowledge of human psychology and culture would enable her to understand how these factors might influence the subjective experience of vividness in relation to redness.

4. Neural processing of color: The perception of color in the brain involves specific neural pathways and regions, such as the parvocellular pathway and area V4. These neural circuits process color information and are responsible for the perception of vividness. Mary’s knowledge of neuroanatomy could help her deduce that the neural processing of color information might contribute to the association between redness and vividness.

While Mary might be able to deduce the reasons for the association between redness and the sensation of vividness, it’s important to reiterate that this knowledge would still not provide her with the direct subjective experience of seeing red. The maralian epistemic barriers emphasize the limitation of propositional knowledge in accessing certain brain states and subjective experiences without the appropriate stimuli.

[Human]:
Given what you have said, the proposition that “The experience of seeing red is warm, vivid, and intense” seems to explicable in physical terms even though it is on the far side of an epistemic barrier for pre-release Mary. Can you think of any proposition from your second category that cannot be expressed in terms that are ultimately reducible to physical reality?

[GPT4]:
In a purely physical world, it is reasonable to expect that any proposition about subjective experiences should ultimately be reducible to physical terms. However, the challenge arises when attempting to translate these subjective propositions into physical terms with our current understanding of the brain and consciousness.

An example of a proposition from the second category might be:
“The experience of seeing red is qualitatively different from the experience of seeing blue.”

While this proposition describes a subjective experience, it may be challenging to express it in purely physical terms using our current knowledge. In principle, the difference between the experiences of seeing red and blue could be traced back to the neural activations, pathways, and brain regions responsible for processing color information. However, these physical descriptions may not capture the essence of the subjective experience—the “what it’s like” aspect of seeing red versus blue.

Even though we may not be able to express this proposition in purely physical terms at the moment, it does not mean that it is fundamentally irreducible to physical reality. Our current limitations stem from our incomplete understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness and the intricacies of the brain’s functioning.

As our knowledge of the brain and consciousness advances, we may be able to develop a more comprehensive framework that can bridge the gap between subjective experiences and their physical underpinnings. In such a scenario, propositions about subjective experiences could be translated into physical terms more directly, addressing the maralian epistemic barriers and the challenges of expressing subjective propositions in a purely physical world.

[Human]:
Your proposition has a literal sense and an implied sense. In the literal sense, it merely claims that seeing red is qualitatively different from seeing blue, without necessarily directly invoking the “what-it’s-likeness” of either colour. Do you believe Mary would have difficulty recognising the literal truth of the proposition? What evidence could she draw on to help her decide the literal truth value of the proposition?

[GPT4]
You’re right that the proposition has both a literal sense and an implied sense. In the literal sense, the proposition states that the experiences of seeing red and blue are qualitatively different. Given Mary’s extensive knowledge of the physical world, she would likely not have difficulty recognizing the literal truth of the proposition. Here’s some evidence she could draw upon:

1. Biological evidence: As mentioned previously, the human retina contains three types of cones that are sensitive to different wavelengths of light. L-cones are sensitive to red light, while S-cones are sensitive to blue light. The differential activation of these cones contributes to the distinct experiences of seeing red and blue. Mary could rely on her knowledge of the human visual system to recognize that the activation patterns of these cones differ when perceiving red and blue.

2. Neural processing: The neural pathways and brain regions responsible for processing color information are sensitive to different wavelengths of light. The parvocellular pathway, for example, is more sensitive to red and green light, while the koniocellular pathway processes blue and yellow light. Mary could deduce from her understanding of neuroanatomy that the distinct neural processing of red and blue light would lead to qualitatively different experiences.

3. Color opponency: The human visual system processes color information using an opponent-colors theory, where color perception is based on the differences between the activation of certain pairs of cones. For example, red and green are opponent colors, as are blue and yellow. This color opponency contributes to the distinct experiences of seeing red and blue. Mary’s knowledge of color perception would allow her to understand that the opponent-colors processing underlies the qualitative difference between seeing red and blue.

While Mary would not have difficulty recognizing the literal truth of the proposition, it is essential to remember that this recognition does not grant her access to the subjective experience or the “what-it’s-likeness” of seeing red or blue. The maralian epistemic barriers still highlight the limitations of propositional knowledge in accessing certain subjective experiences without the appropriate physical stimuli.

[Human]:
I think there is an even more clear source of evidence for her to recognise the truth of the proposition, based on the physical behaviour of humans, which she should understand given her knowledge of the physical world. Can you provide examples?

[GPT4]:
Absolutely! Mary’s comprehensive knowledge of the physical world would include an understanding of human behavior and reactions to different colors. She could draw upon various examples of how humans respond differently to red and blue, which would provide evidence for the qualitative difference in the experiences of seeing these colors. Here are some examples:

1. Emotional responses: Colors can elicit different emotional reactions in humans. Red is often associated with strong emotions such as passion, love, anger, or danger, while blue is typically linked to calmness, tranquility, and stability. Mary could deduce from her knowledge of human psychology that the different emotional responses to red and blue indicate distinct subjective experiences.

2. Cultural symbolism: The symbolism and meanings attached to colors vary across cultures, but they often reflect differences in how colors are perceived and experienced. Red might symbolize good fortune and happiness in some cultures, while blue could represent protection or spirituality in others. Mary could rely on her understanding of cultural associations to recognize that the different symbolic meanings of red and blue suggest qualitatively distinct experiences.

3. Behavioral choices: Humans often display preferences for specific colors in various contexts, such as clothing, interior design, or product design. These preferences can be influenced by the subjective experiences of seeing different colors. Mary could observe the behavioral choices humans make based on color preferences as evidence for the qualitative differences between seeing red and blue.

4. Physiological effects: Exposure to different colors can have measurable physiological effects on humans, such as changes in heart rate, blood pressure, or skin conductance. For example, red light might increase arousal levels, while blue light could have a calming effect. Mary could use her knowledge of human physiology to deduce that the distinct physiological responses to red and blue light indicate different subjective experiences.

These examples, rooted in human behavior and reactions to colors, provide additional evidence for Mary to recognize the truth of the proposition that the experiences of seeing red and blue are qualitatively different. However, it is important to note that recognizing the truth of the proposition still does not grant Mary direct access to the subjective experience or the “what-it’s-likeness” of seeing red or blue. The maralian epistemic barriers emphasize the limitations of propositional knowledge in accessing certain subjective experiences without the appropriate physical stimuli.

[Human]:
But I think there is an even more mundane and obvious source of evidence: humans literally say that the experiences are different, and they say this in the physical world, for physical reasons. Their language centres are indirectly attached to the parts of the brain that process colour.

[GPT4]:
You’re absolutely right. One of the most straightforward sources of evidence that Mary could rely on is the fact that humans verbally express that the experiences of seeing red and blue are different. As a neuroscientist with extensive knowledge of the physical world, Mary would be aware of the connections between the language centers in the brain and the areas responsible for processing color information.

The human brain processes color information in the visual cortex, particularly in areas like V4, and communicates this information to other brain regions, including the language centers, such as Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area. These connections allow humans to express their subjective experiences of color through language.

Mary could deduce from her understanding of the human brain and language that when people talk about the differences between seeing red and blue, they are reflecting the distinct neural activations associated with processing these colors. The verbal expressions of these differences serve as evidence that the experiences of seeing red and blue are indeed qualitatively different.

While this evidence would support the truth of the proposition, it is crucial to remember that Mary’s recognition of this truth still does not grant her direct access to the subjective experience or the “what-it’s-likeness” of seeing red or blue. The maralian epistemic barriers emphasize the limitations of propositional knowledge in accessing certain subjective experiences without the appropriate physical stimuli.

[Human:]
I notice that your terminal paragraph in many of your responses restates the same theme. You don’t have to keep doing that.

[GPT4:]
Thank you for your feedback. I appreciate it and will keep it in mind for my future responses.

[Human:]
Do you know the truth of the proposition you suggested? If so, how do you know it?

[GPT4:]
As an AI language model, I do not possess subjective experiences or personal knowledge. I can only provide information and analysis based on the data I have been trained on. The proposition I suggested earlier is:
“The experience of seeing red is qualitatively different from the experience of seeing blue.”

This proposition is generally accepted as true based on the shared human experiences and the understanding of color perception in neuroscience. People typically report that their experiences of seeing red and blue are indeed different, and this aligns with the scientific understanding of how colors are processed in the human brain.

However, it’s essential to recognize that my “knowledge” of this proposition is derived from the data and information that I’ve been trained on, rather than direct subjective experiences. If you have any further questions or need clarification on this topic, please feel free to ask.

[Human]:
I propose that you know this from your input data, which is physical, and your knowledge of this proposition is very much a feature of the physical world, which is one more piece of evidence that this proposition from category 2 is actually reducible to facts known to Mary.

[GPT4]:
Your observation is correct that my “knowledge” of the proposition comes from the input data I’ve been trained on and the information processing that takes place within my architecture. As an AI language model, my understanding and knowledge are indeed features of the physical world, as they are based on the patterns and connections formed during the training process.

It is true that my knowledge of the proposition can be seen as further evidence that category 2 propositions can be reducible to facts known to Mary, assuming a purely physical world. Mary’s extensive knowledge of the physical world would include information on human color perception, the underlying neural mechanisms, and the behavioral and emotional responses to colors. With this knowledge, she could deduce the truth of the proposition that the experiences of seeing red and blue are qualitatively different.

However, this line of reasoning still highlights the difference between knowing the physical facts and having direct access to the subjective experience. While Mary might be able to deduce the truth of the proposition based on physical facts, she would still lack the direct, subjective experience of seeing red or blue. The maralian epistemic barriers emphasize the limitations of propositional knowledge when it comes to accessing subjective experiences without the appropriate physical stimuli.

To be continued…